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DISCUSSION.
THOUGHT AND THINGS.
Professor Moore's remarks upon my book of the above title in the
March BULLETIN lead me to make certain explanations. I shall refer
also to criticisms made by others.
The treatment in my book is a compromise between two methods
(as suggested by Professor Russell in the Journ. of Philos.}. I find
it impossible to treat each genetic ' mode' in turn exhaustively, by a
method that tries to make out longitudinal 'progressions.' For each
topic, a certain before-and-after review is necessary, in order to get
the movement of consciousness; and this inevitably requires some
repetition and restatement of the main characters of the mode in the
interest of the particular problem under investigation. So it becomes
a question, in order to reach the most effective exposition, of reducing
the retracing to the minimum, without at the same time going over to
a barren analytic and structural point of view.
To illustrate: in the second volume I find it impossible to dis-
cuss the linguistic embodiment of thought genetically without re-
curring to the general movement of development of thought, which
has already been depicted in earlier chapters.1
As to the use of new terms — on that point, I simply take up any
glove the critic may see fit to throw down. It all depends on whether
the conceptions worked out are worth naming, and have not been
named before (granting of course the relative appropriateness of the.
terms suggested). In this matter, it hardly behooves me to anticipate
the verdict of the public; but the opinion of the Nation's reviewer is
this : " The vocabulary of well-considered new technical terms that
this volume expounds is in itself a precious gift to psychological in-
vestigation. For with each of these new terms there goes a valuable
new conception." This is by C. S. Peirce, whose opinion is of the
highest.
As to the ' static absolute' I don't care for it — and who isn't tired
of it ? — because it is a purely logical resort, reached as a presupposi-
tion of an equally ' static' truth. But as to a ' dynamic relative '— to
suggest a contrast term — that sounds just now fresh and very modern;
certainly it is less hackneyed than the other. But when we look it in
• I cite this instance since the chapter on ' Thought and Language' is to
be printed in the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW for May, and may be glanced at by
the reader.
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the face, what is its complexion? It is a postulate of a practical
dualism, as crassly unintelligible as the other is logically over-theoret-
ical. I can't rest content with a ' dynamic' that has nothing outside
to move it and no reason inside for moving ! If experience proceeds
by readjusting to situations, whence comes the situation that ' puts it
up ' to it to readjust? Why does it grow discontent with its own
habit-world ? Is a discrete unintelligible dynamic any better than a
contentless formal static? To kick where there are no pricks may
satisfy a strenuous ' relative,' but beyond endangering our collections
of precious antique china, its only result is to strain its own leg-tendons !
I'll stake the whole business on Professor Moore's answer to the fol-
lowing two questions:
First, how can experience of the dynamic-relative type secure or
utilize knowledge that is socially valid, without at the some time rein-
stating other things as valid as the social fellows, including the thinker
himself?
Second, how can an experience that has no environment save its
own habit, and no reality save its present function, get up any ' dynamic'
at all?
Or to put these two questions in one: In what sense is the will of
the mother spanking the child part of the habit of the child, and why
does the child's experience take on this particular phase of ' relative
dynamic' ? — this occasional and very disconcerting phase of habit ?
The ' relative dynamic' is all right in its place; but so is the rela-
tive ' static' To be ' relative,' we must be dualistic, realistic, and —
' things are what they seem' becomes the motto of a ' radical empir-
ical ' pluralism.
My own view, to be argued fully enough in my later volumes, is
that the sesthetic is a mode of experience that not only reconciles these
dualisms and pluralisms, content-wise — in a cross-section — but also
continues its mediation progression-ivise, longitudinally: so that we
can fairly say that in it experience has a way of finding its dynamics
intelligible as a truthful and so far static meaning, and also of acting
upon its established truths as immediate and so far dynamic satisfac-
tions. In short, our relativisms are contrast-meanings, dualisms, in-
strumentalities one to another, and the mediation and abolishing of
these contrasts, dualisms, means to ends, removes the relativities and
gives the only tenable ' absolute.' This is the sort of ' absolute' expe-
rience is competent to reach. If you ask why this does not develop
again into new relativities, I answer, in fact it does ; but in meaning it
does not. For the meaning is the universal of all such cases of media-
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tion. If the mediation effected in the aesthetic is one of typical mean-
ing everywhere in the -progression of mental ' dynamic, then it is
just its value that it discounts in advance any new demands for media-
tion which new dualisms may make. The aesthetic is absolute then in
the only sense that the term can mean anything : it is universal pro-
gression-wise^ as well as content or relation-wise. It mediates the
genetic dynamogenies as well as the static dualisms.
The following brief explanations are relevant to certain of Pro-
fessor Moore's difficulties.
As to ' meaning,' I hold that after meaning arises as over against
mere present content, then the content also of necessity and by contrast
also becomes meaning; since then consciousness may intend or mean
either, or the difference between the two. As I put it in the book, with
the rise of meaning there arise meanings (in the plural). To hold a
content to just its bare presence is to make it a meaning — after con-
sciousness is once able to mean '•that only and not anything else.'
As to the distinction between ' general' and ' schematic,' between
'belief' and 'assumption'— that is the radical position of my entire work,
and I am glad to have it called attention to. It connects with and car-
ries further the ' assumption' theory of Meinong and the Austrian school.
My second volume rests its interpretations directly upon this distinction.
To say that 'schematic' meaning, 'assumption,' is not ' general,' nor
' universal,' nor ' particular,' nor ' singular'—all of which I do say —
is to say that it is a mode of meaning suigeneris. It is the intent of
question, assumption, hypothesis, prospective reading—over against
all the other meanings just mentioned, which are those of belief, accept-
ance, retrospective reading, proof. It means that the instrumental
intent of a meaning is not a general meaning, but goes before it. A
meaning can be instrumental only to a general not yet reached. And
a ' general' meaning, when made instrumental to further discovery, is
then not general, but becomes in turn again ' schematic'
So far from being antagonistic to an instrumental view, this fur-
nishes the clue to it. On this distinction, and this alone — one destined
I think to prove the most fruitful in the epistemology of modern times
— the logical processes can be construed as essentially experimental
from start to finish. This is the attempt of my second volume, which
is now in press.
In respect to ' effort' and the ' subject,' I do not resort to any
hypothesis of ' activity' in a philosophical sense. I find that, for the
' knower' himself, the sense of effort — whatever its mechanism *-
1
 The kinsesthetic theory is most likely, to me.
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distributed variously as ' efforts' here and there, gets segregated in a
sense of control which is the ' self' of judgment.
As to the ' inwardness' of thoughts — I hold that as thoughts they
are in a context of reflection, recognized and intended as such; but that
there is always that belief-reference which acknowledges or assumes
the original control-sphere. I reflect alike on ' serpents' and ' sea-
serpents,' but any intelligible use of them as meanings presupposes
the reference to their respective existence spheres. This reference is
for me the essence of ' truth' as meaning. The serpent idea is ' true'
when referred to the proper sphere, and so is the sea-serpent idea.
There is always the matching of experiences as between what is true
and what the true is true to.
One other point. While saying that the entire world of objects of
experience or reflection is such to a self or subject, and is also referred
to its original control, which ' holds the entire system to its moorings,'
I mean two things besides. First, the original control, the ' moor-
ings,' to which each idea or object of reflection is referred, is itself
the experienced or made-up set of meanings of that original mode —
as the reference of the idea ' horse' to the perceptual horse-experience
— the envelope of the developing psychic process being nowhere
ruptured} The controls, ' foreign' as well as ' inner,' are all
psychic meanings. And second, the dualism of controls does, as Mr.
Moore suggests, live to the last within the sphere of logical meanings;
it will not down; the dualism of reflection itself is a redistribution, not
a mediation, of the control factors. But my conclusion from this \&
not a dualistic one, and not one of intellectualism; but one of
a-logicism. For the failure of the logical to mediate its own and the
earlier dualisms is just the opportunity of a genuine mediating experi-
ence. The necessity of logic is the opportunity of aesthetic. It is the
cry of embarrassment of logical finality, on the one hand, and of prag-
matic relativity, with its cruder dualisms, on the other hand, that has
rung down the passages of history, and inspired the various solutions
of immediacy, all the way from the logical postulates of pure identity,
to the affectivist postulates of mystical contemplation. However inef-
fective these historical ' immediacies' may have proved, they have
recurred and will still recur. My own effort is to find out just what is
universal and saving in this recurrent endeavor, seeing that genetic
analysis shows the endeavor to be inevitable.
J . MARK BALDWIN.
'It is however an envelope of inter-psychic or common, in no sense private
meaning, as I argue in detail in the forthcoming Vol. II.
